Michigan Law Review
Volume 52

Issue 6

1956

REAL PROPERTY-RECORDING--LATENT DEFECT IN
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEED
Eugene Alkema
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
Eugene Alkema, REAL PROPERTY-RECORDING--LATENT DEFECT IN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEED, 52
MICH. L. REV. 927 (1954).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol52/iss6/20

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1954]

RECENT DECISIONS

927

REAL PROPERTY-RECORDING--LA'I'ENT DEFECT IN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF

DEED-In 1947 A executed a deed to B, which was recorded in July 1951.
On May 7, 1951 A executed a deed of the same property to C, who did
not record. C's deed bore a certificate of acknowledgment, but in fact the
acknowledgment was taken by telephone and not in person as required by
law to make it eligible for record. On May 9, 1951 C conveyed to D, who
recorded both conveyances in his chain of title on May 26, 1951. In an
action by B to quiet title, held, for B. Since the deed from A to C was not
properly acknowledged, the deed was not entitled to record, and its actual
record was not notice to D of its execution. Therefore, D was not a purchaser in good faith and was not protected against the prior conveyance to
B. Messersmith v. Smith, (N.D. 1953) 60 N.W. (2d) 276.
The North Dakota recording act is of the "notice-race'' type which makes
void any unrecorded conveyance "as against any subsequent purchaser in
good faith . . . whose conveyance . . . first is recorded. . . ."1 The rationale
of the principal case is that D was not a purchaser in good faith because he
did not have notice of the execution of the deed to his grantor, since it was
defectively acknowledged and as such not entitled to record.2 After a deed
is recorded, the record is constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser in
another chain of title, so that he is deprived of his bona fide status and its
consequent protection. Notice is irrelevant among those in the same chain
of title, for notice can be operative only when there are antagonistic chains
of title derived from a common granter. Here, when D took a conveyance
from C it would seem that he was in complete good faith. He had neither
actual notice of the prior unrecorded conveyance to B nor constructive notice
of it, since at the time of purchase that deed was unrecorded. In resting;
its decision on a lack of good faith on D's part because he purchased from
one who was not record owner but who had a conveyance from the record
owner, the North Dakota court appears to be incorrect.3 But the result may
be technically justified on other grounds. Under a pure "notice" statute,
a grantee is preferred over a prior grantee who did not record, even though
the subsequent grantee himself fails to record; a "notice-race" statute differs
in that there is the further condition that the subsequent purchaser must
record his conveyance first. In the principal case, D failed to record properly
his whole chain of title and validly recorded only the conveyance to himself.
B then recorded while the intermediate conveyance to C was in effect unrecorded. On this state of the record a purchaser from B would theoretically
be unable to discover D's title even though it was recorded, since D's deed
was isolated from the common grantor, A, by the failure to record the interN.D. Rev. Code (1943) §47-1941.
To be protected, the purchaser must prove the execution of all conveyances in his
chain of title, and in the principal case the court said that D had tried to do this by
proving only the acknowledgment of the deed to C. Failing this, D was not in privity with
A and was not protected. However, the decision does not appear to rest on this, but rather
on the ground that D could not be protected as a bona fide purchaser.
3 Quinn v. Johnson, 117 Minn. 378, 135 N.W. 1000 (1912).
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mediate connecting conveyance.4 The notice-race statute is evidently intended
to avoid this situation by preventing such lapses in the record, and is in line
with the policy underlying all recording acts of providing a place for a potential purchaser to determine safely the status of title. The notice-race recording act protects the subsequent purchaser only when he records not
merely his immediate conveyance, but also his whole chain of title.I• D in
the principal case would thus not be protected against the prior grantee,
B, who was the first to record properly his whole chain of title even though
this recording was after D had recorded his conveyance. However, it must
be noted that the intermediate conveyance to C actually did appear on the
record, the defect vitiating its effect being a wholly latent one. Neither D
nor a possible purchaser from B ( who in examining the record would in fact
discover that D had some relation to the property) could suspect solely from
the record that the acknowledgment was defective and the record of the
conveyance to C of no effect.6 In view of this and of the fact that D in
good faith did everything possible to comply with the recording act,7 to find
that he is not protected by it because his whole chain of title was not properly
recorded appears to be an extremely technical result which overlooks the
policy of the recording act of protecting those who attempt to comply with
its provisions and who rely upon the title as it appears of record.

Eugene Alkema

4 This

assumes the normal record indexed only by grantors and grantees. Necessarily,

to discover the interest of any grantee, the conveyance to his immediate grantor must also

be recorded since a purchaser tracing title to that grantor and finding no recorded conveyance
from him would be unable to proceed further and wonld assume he is the owner. With a
tract index where conveyances are indexed in relation to specific land, the grantee's interest
is accessible even though his grantor may not appear of record.
5Zimmer v. Sundell, 237 Wis. 270, 296 N.W. 589 (1941). Cf. Abbott v. Parker,
103 Ark. 425, 147 S.W. 70 (1912); Board of Education v. Hughes, 118 Minn. 404, 136 .
N.W. 1095 (1912); Quinn v. Johnson, note 3 supra; 4 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY
§17.10 (1952); annotation, 133 A.L.R. 886 (1941).
6 Commonly, when an instrument is improperly recorded, the actual record does not
afford constructive notice of that instrument. However, the courts are divided as to the
effect of recording an instrument which is disqualified from record by a latent defect, many
courts holding that that record does constitute constructive notice of the instrument. See
annotations in 19 A.L.R. 1074 (1922); 72 A.L.R. 1039 (1931). Also, if the purchaser
actually sees the record of an improperly recorded conveyance, several courts have held that
he has actual knowledge of the conveyance and is not then a bona fide purchaser. See the
cases cited in 2 PoMEROY, EQUITY JurusPRUDENCE, 5th ed., §600, n. 7 (1941).
7 Aigler, "Operation of the Recording Acts," 22 MICH. L. REv. 405 at 415 (1924).

